



Africa Criminal Justice Reform
 Organisation pour la Réforme de la Justice Pénale en Afrique
 Organização para a Reforma da Justiça Criminal em África

DEMOCRATIC POLICING

A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

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Introduction

There is no universally accepted definition of democratic policing. Concepts often subsumed within the phrase include ‘professional policing’,¹ ‘SMART policing’,² and ‘evidence-based policing’.³ For the purposes of this fact sheet, democratic policing means at least (1) the police’s abidance to the rule of law, (2) accountability of the police, and (3) procedural fairness by the police in service of the public. Within these, a number of sub-categories can be identified: seeking to create a security environment promoting democracy; accountable to the law, not a law unto itself; accountable to democratic structures and the community; transparent in its activities; prioritising the safety and rights of individuals and groups and protecting human rights; providing professional and ethical services; representing the community it serves; structured to best achieve these ends, and demonstrating internal adherence to the principles of good governance.⁴

The antithesis of democratic policing is regime policing. This protects governments rather than citizens; answers to a

regime rather than the people; controls rather than protects populations; protects a dominant group; and remains separate from communities.⁵


The next section describes nine key dimensions of democratic policing, as shown in Figure 1.

Nine dimensions of democratic policing

This article identifies nine dimensions required for democratic policing. These are introduced below and explored in more detail.

Knowledge: Police officers are highly skilled in their work and can apply skills to their post-level. Policing is based on knowledge of what works. Capacity development to fulfil a particular job function is thus central to this dimension. Managers use data to evaluate policing, identify success and challenges, and learn lessons.

Figure 1



Effectiveness and efficiency: Effective policing in a democratic society refers to the successful maintenance of an environment of order, security, and trust, in which the public attribute their abilities to go about their daily routines without fear to the quality of police services they receive. Police effectiveness is ultimately about what and how much

the police have accomplished in the eyes of the public. Efficiency refers to the cost-effective utilisation of resources.

Ethics and accountability: Police conduct is ethical and lawful. Transgressors are held accountable. Internal accountability mechanisms (e.g. disciplinary processes) are effective and complemented by strong external checks and balances. Police hold each other accountable for disciplinary

misconduct and criminal activity (including corruption), with the ultimate aim to modify unlawful behaviour and institutional practices that fuel such behaviour. Ethical and accountable policing generates trust from the policed. The different spheres of government collaborate in the spirit of cooperative governance.

Rights-based: Policing is based on adherence to and the protection of human rights, and on the values of transparency, fairness, equality and justice. The rights of all people, including suspects, are enshrined in the constitution. All people are treated fairly.

Police as citizens: The rights of police officers are protected by the constitution, both in their interactions with colleagues and with the public. Police are treated fairly.

Objectivity: Police conduct is objective and neutral. It does not favour individuals or groups. It is the task of police (with other stakeholders) to protect democratic political life.

Responsivity: Police are responsive to the needs of the public and victims of crime and exhibit community-centred policing practices.

Empathy: Police demonstrate empathy with people and victims of crime.

Trust: The public trusts the police. Particular attention is paid to how accessible and approachable the police is perceived to be with particular reference to the diversity in a population.

Linking the dimensions

For the purpose of analysis these concepts can by and large be separated, but it appears that in practice they are intertwined, often inter-dependent and frequently mutually reinforcing. The failing in one dimension will have consequences for other dimensions and *vice versa*. There is to some extent causal and hierarchical relations between the different dimensions. Figure 1 presents the relationships between the dimensions. Read from top to bottom, it

presents five input variables for the police to deliver. These produce three positive outputs leading to trust in, and the legitimacy of the police. This is discussed in more detail below, describing as if Figure 1 is read from bottom to top, starting with the overall result being sought which is derived from the outcome, flowing from a set of outputs that are the result of a range of inputs.

The result being sought is legitimacy

Successful democratic policing results in police being perceived as legitimate authorities. This requires that the public trusts police to behave in the broad public interest. Even when difficult to define, ‘public interest serves as the fundamental criterion for establishing the legitimation of power. Political power, then, is legitimate and necessary, and even acceptable, only inasmuch as it can be established that it serves public interest.’⁶ This legitimising function is dependent on trust, namely the trust that the public has that political power (i.e. in the form of the police) will be used in the public interest; conversely if the police are not trusted by the public to act in its interest, it creates a legitimacy deficit for the police.

The outcome is trust

Trust is produced when policing is characterised by objectivity, empathy and responsivity, as discussed in the next section. Trust can be described as the belief, despite uncertainty, that something you believe should be done will be done and the belief, despite uncertainty, that something you believe should not be done, will not be done, the outcome of which will be beneficial to you or another’.⁷ It also involves faith that one’s vulnerability won’t be abused.⁸ Trust in an institution is at least partly reliant on the behavioural conduct of that institution.⁹ Trust in the police therefore, is a function of perceptions of police conduct.¹⁰

Trust is not simply a state of mind of an individual, but rather involves a consequence associated with some kind of risk to one's ultimate welfare.

Perceptions of competence and effectiveness also inform trust in police. If police are seen as competent in carrying out investigations, and at the same time meet expected outcomes (catching criminals or managing crisis situations caused by accidents, riots, extreme weather, etc.), people will probably consider the police as successful and place higher trust in them.¹¹ If people believe that police treat everyone fairly, they are more likely to trust police, obey the law in their absence, and cooperate with them.¹² Where police are perceived as unprofessional, incompetent or abusive, trust will decline.¹³ Empirical evidence proposes that perceptions about police effectiveness are positively related to trust in the police.¹⁴ When the police are perceived to be procedurally fair, the public are more likely to co-operate with them and to perceive them as legitimate.¹⁵

The output variables

Objectivity

Objectivity, impartiality, being unbiased, reasonableness and rationality are closely related concepts in the law enforcement and the legal environment. The Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines objective as “expressing or dealing with facts or conditions as perceived without distortion by personal feelings, prejudices, or interpretations”. A police officer is expected to be objective and treat people impartially, without bias, and make decisions or draw conclusions that are reasonable and rational. These aspirational notions, or values, exist because fundamentally we expect equal treatment and not be disadvantaged by (negative) personal and subjective perceptions held by police officers about individuals or groups.

As much as law may provide prescripts and guidance to police officers to behave in an objective, impartial, unbiased, reasonable and rational way, the law also recognises that police officers require discretionary powers to exercise their duties on a day-to-day basis (see below). How the police exercise these discretionary powers is important, because if misused (i.e. subjective use) it has severe consequences for both the public and the police. Public perceptions of bias or unfair treatment by the police has immediate negative consequences for the police in respect of trust and ultimately legitimacy, while fair and respectful treatment builds confidence and trust in, and compliance with police.¹⁶

Objectivity in policing thus requires that the police is able to express themselves or deal with perceived facts or conditions, without distortion by personal feelings, prejudices, or interpretations, and not use their powers to favour individuals or groups. Fundamentally it is the task of the police (together with other stakeholders) to protect democratic political life and not distort it through a perceived or real lack of objectivity.

Responsivity

Many advocates of ‘professional policing’ emphasise outputs such as response times, arrests, and reported crime as measures of police performance.¹⁷ However, policing is much more than these measures indicate. It is important to consider an officer's response to the needs expressed during interactions with the public.¹⁸ Police responsivity is a vital component of democratic policing.¹⁹

Democratic policing literature points towards the value of responsiveness: police must be ‘responsive to some expression of the views of the public’.²⁰ Importantly, responsiveness is not simply acquiescing to a generally expressed will. Rather, ‘responding’ can mean refuting, with reason, public demands.²¹ Police and their managers may be called to ‘respond’ to a wide range of individuals, groups and institutions. Three further variables contributing to

responsiveness are: information; redress and participation.²² Information underpins other democratic criteria and promotes responsiveness in two ways, namely the publication of information is a stimulus for citizens, groups and institutions to present preferences to police who must then respond, and providing information can be a reasonable response.²³

Redress requires that victims can seek reparation through effective mechanisms. These should allow for the expression of discontent with police actions, and for this to be effectively addressed. Reparation can take several forms: restitution, financial compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction (through complaints, investigations, truth-seeking mechanisms, official apologies etc.) and guarantees of non-repetition.²⁴

Participation is a stimulus demanding a police response. A responsive police service incorporates reactions to citizen complaints. This includes accountability and an acceptance that police must explain themselves. Responsiveness also relates “the unique cultural, ideological and legal characteristics of a country”.²⁵ In essence the police should be responsive to the needs of the public and victims of crime and exhibit community-centred policing practices.

Empathy

Empathy is narrower than responsivity. Empathy is most commonly defined as the ability to understand the situation of another,²⁶ However, according to Henderson there are three other meanings conveyed by this word: feeling the emotion of another; understanding the experience or situation of another, both affectively and cognitively, often achieved by imagining oneself to be in the position of the other; and action brought about by experiencing the distress of another.²⁷

Murphy and Tyler suggest four issues that are key to police legitimacy: respect, neutrality, trustworthiness, and voice, with the last referring to the broader notion of

'communication'. Empathy is part of effective communication. They note that, procedurally just policing requires that police commit to four key principles when interacting with others.²⁸ Apart from treating people with respect, they must show “that they can make neutral decisions based on consistently applied legal rules and principles and the facts of a case, not on personal opinions and biases.”

Police are expected to display empathic qualities and skills when dealing with victims of crime. As an authority in which a great deal of trust is placed in, particularly when affected by a crime or having had your rights violated, it is important for the police to convey a compassionate impression, beyond the qualities of responsivity. In many instances the police will be the first responders to a crime scene, accident or other calamity and must therefore be able to deal with such situations in a manner that respects the dignity of those affected and acknowledging the impact of the event on those involved.

Simple acts such as listening and communicating can help transform stressful situations into successful trust-building exercises.²⁹ When police empathise with the public, citizens are more likely to agree that the result of their interaction was fair and deserved, even when they are sanctioned.³⁰ This improves community-police relations, trust, and the legitimacy of the police.

The input variables

Knowledge

Professionalism requires expert knowledge in a particular field, such as medicine or accounting. Professions are involved in birth, survival, physical and emotional health, dispute resolution and law-based social order, finance and credit information, educational attainment and socialization, construction and the built environment, military engagement, peace-keeping and security, entertainment and

leisure, religion and our negotiations with the next world.³¹ In short, we rely on professionals' knowledge to assist us to manage a wide range of risks. As such we must ask: What risks do we entrust the police to deal with and do they have the requisite knowledge to do so? Are the police professionals in the use of coercion? Do they know when to use it and exactly how much to use in order to remain within the confines of the law and human rights standards?

Professionalism implies trust, because it is based on knowledge (and sometimes guilty knowledge) and lay people must place their trust in professionals. Professionalism requires professionals to be worthy of trust and to maintain confidentiality and concealing guilty knowledge by not exploiting it for evil purposes. In return for knowledge, ethics and trust, professionals are rewarded with authority, privileged rewards and higher social status.³²

Being a 'professional' is more than being competent at one's job, as such a 'professional', for example, seeks responsibility and welcomes accountability, demonstrates customer care principles, interacts with colleagues in a professional manner (e.g. treats colleagues as customers and generates enthusiasm) is self-critical, and listens.³³

The Independent Police Commission for England and Wales attaches several distinct meanings to the idea of professionalism:

- High expectations: Professional police are police who are held to demanding standards of conduct. It means a police service in which slack performance, unkempt appearance, rude manners, and loose ethics are not tolerated.
- Self-regulating: In the manner of the legal profession, the medical profession or the accounting profession – ensuring institutional autonomy and freedom from political interference;
- Expertise: Professional policing, in this sense, means policing that is reflective and knowledge-based, rather than a matter of common sense, intuition, or innate talent;

- Internalised norms: Rather than by rules enforced through a bureaucratic command structure or a formalised system of external oversight.³⁴

Effectiveness and efficiency

Effectiveness is the degree to which something produces a desired result. It does not factor in the related costs. A programme may be effective, but not efficient or cost effective.

An assessment of efficiency relates the results or outputs of a programme to its costs.³⁵ Ideally a monetary value is placed on the benefits arising from activities, and this is compared with the costs of the programme. In most cases, however, an accurate monetary quantification of outputs and outcomes is not possible. In these cases, the assessment of efficiency focuses on ratios such as the number of households provided with a service per million Rand invested.

An assessment of cost-effectiveness asks whether output benefits could have been produced at a lower cost. Cost-effectiveness is the extent to which a programme has "achieved results at a lower cost compared with alternatives ... Shortcomings in cost-effectiveness occur when the programme is not the least-cost alternative or approach to achieving the same or similar outputs and outcomes."³⁶

Hung-En Sung notes that "perceptions of police efficacy matter because on them hinges the legitimacy of the state."³⁷ At the same time, a burgeoning, empirically-informed literature on procedural justice in policing suggests that being treated fairly by police is, in many instances, considered more important in public assessments of police than is their perceived effectiveness in reducing crime. What's more, where people believe police treat them fairly, they are more likely to identify with the authority police represent (the democratic state), to cooperate with police, and to obey the law in their absence.³⁸ Procedural justice is thus central to police effectiveness.

Ethics and accountability

Police have exceptional powers, including the power to infringe on fundamental rights. These include the right to freedom (through arrest and detention), the right to safety and security (through use force) and the right to life (in some jurisdictions, through their right to use lethal force beyond the strict remit of self-defence). These extraordinary powers must be subject to strict accountability mechanisms that are effective, transparent, accessible and change-driven. Accountability is a cornerstone of democratic policing.³⁹ The antithesis of accountability is impunity. Accountability is understood to mean the relationship “between the bearer of a right or a legitimate claim and the agents or agencies responsible for fulfilling or respecting that right”. This means that a government must be able to and indeed explain how it executed its mandate.⁴⁰ The point has also been made that the normal features of a democracy (e.g. multi-party elections and universal suffrage) are necessary, but not sufficient to ensure healthy accountability between citizens and the government.⁴¹ Democratic elections therefore do not make for clean government and new democracies remain haunted by human rights violations, nepotism and corruption, which do not disappear with the advent of democratic elections.⁴²

The construct of accountability can be split into two dimensions: horizontal accountability and vertical accountability. The state must be willing “to restrain itself by creating and sustaining independent public institutions to oversee its actions, demand explanations, and when circumstances warrant, impose penalties on the government for improper and illegal activity”.⁴³ The accountability that the state imposes on itself and on governments is commonly referred to as horizontal accountability. Vertical accountability refers to the control external institutions exercise over a government, such as the electorate, the media and civil society.⁴⁴ The fact that a relationship exists between the state and another internal or external body

does not automatically produce effective accountability, and three principles need to be adhered to, namely transparency, answerability, and controllability. Transparency means that state officials have a duty to act visibly, predictably and understandably.⁴⁵ Their actions must be predictable because they are guided by policy, legislation, regulations, standing orders and good practice. When called to account, officials must be able to motivate their decisions and actions in a manner that is rational and justifiable. In sum, it needs to be known what officials are doing, and when asked, they must be able to provide an understandable and predictable answer.⁴⁶

The answerability requirement states that decision-makers must be able to justify their decisions and actions publicly in order to substantiate that they are reasonable, rational and within their mandate.⁴⁷ Answerability (and transparency) will, however, be meaningless if there are not mechanisms in place to sanction actions and decisions in contravention of the mandate. Accountability institutions must be able to exercise control over the institutions that they oversee.⁴⁸ Failure to hold government and individuals accountable fosters impunity.⁴⁹

Even if only a few police abuse their powers, the legitimacy of an entire police force can be damaged.⁵⁰ It is the need for legitimacy that firstly drives the need for accountability mechanisms. Secondly, the purpose of an effective accountability structure is its proactive function: the outputs and consequences of action taken by accountability mechanisms must produce changes in police behaviour and deter misconduct.⁵¹

The first and primary focus of police accountability requires holding individual police officials accountable for their behaviour when performing their policing duties, in particular in relation to their use of force, arrest practices, stop and search, interrogations and treatment of persons in custody.⁵² Such behaviour should be tested against clear laws and policies outlining permissible conduct.⁵³

The second focus of police accountability requires holding police organisations accountable for services rendered.⁵⁴ In this regard, police management needs to ensure adequate training, operational direction, supervision, equipment and infrastructure.⁵⁵ Institutional accountability includes oversight over police policy and police operations by external actors, and is therefore intrinsically linked to transparency and openness.

Police officials can be held individually accountable through oversight mechanisms internal and external to the police. Aggrieved individuals (internal or external to the police) should be able to lay complaints against police officials, which should result in inquiries and/or investigations by internal and/or external authorities empowered and resourced to do so.⁵⁶ External individual accountability mechanisms should be able to formulate recommendations for internal disciplinary action or for criminal prosecution and have these acted upon.⁵⁷ In addition, police officials may be held individually accountable by the judiciary (in particular through criminal proceedings) and, in rare occasions, by the legislature.⁵⁸

Institutions usually exercising institutional oversight over the police are primarily found at the domestic level, but also relate to international mechanisms. Domestically, the executive, the legislature and the judiciary all play a role holding police accountable. Their oversight role is primarily proactive and extends to overseeing the budget and expenditure of the police, appointment and removal processes of senior officials, and policing policy choices.⁵⁹ The judiciary usually plays a reactive institutional oversight role, including in ruling on the police's financial liability, and for wrongdoing committed by its members.⁶⁰ Internationally, state reporting to treaty monitoring bodies and communications submitted by aggrieved individuals are two spheres where police interventions will be subject to institutional accountability.⁶¹

Police accountability mechanisms must be effective throughout the police organisation and in all its functions:

clear policy and operational directions must be given to police officials before police actions or operations, and police must be supervised and monitored during actions and operations. Police misconduct must be effectively addressed after an action or operation, and must lead to reparations for victims, disciplinary action or criminal prosecution against implicated officials, and evaluations that support changes in police conduct and policies, where relevant.⁶² Accountability mechanisms will correct and modify ill behaviour if they are adequately resourced, empowered and independent, receive political support and are under sufficient public pressure to carry out their work.⁶³

Rights-based

A police service that respects, promotes and protects the human rights of all people, suspects and victims in particular, is central to democratic policing.⁶⁴ While the emphasis on different rights may vary between countries, international law upholds numerous fundamental rights relevant to democratic policing. However, it is one thing to recognise fundamental rights in principle and quite another to uphold them in practice.

The UN Pocket Book on Human Rights Standards and Practice for the Police (UN Pocket Book) provides a comprehensive overview of the rights which police must uphold and protect in their work.⁶⁵ It reviews compliance requirements under the following themes:

- *Police Investigations:* Police shall conduct their investigative work while respecting the following rights: right to security, right to a fair trial, right to the presumption of innocence, right to privacy, prohibition of torture and other ill-treatment, right not to be pressured into providing information.⁶⁶

- *Arrest:* Police shall conduct arrests within the boundaries of the following fundamental rights: right to liberty and security, prohibition of arbitrary arrest, right to be informed at the time of arrest of the reasons for arrest, right to be promptly informed of the charges, right to promptly appear before a judicial authority to review the legality of detention that follows the arrest, right to apply for bail, right to access a legal representative, family and a health care professional;⁶⁷
- *Detention:* Police shall detain individuals within the boundaries of the following fundamental rights: right to liberty (detention must be the exception) and security, prohibition of arbitrary detention, right to promptly appear before a judicial authority to review the legality of detention, right to the presumption of innocence, prohibition of torture, prohibition of incommunicado detention, right to be informed of the reasons for detention, right to apply for bail, right to access a legal representative, family and a health care, right to humane conditions of detention, right to be separated (women and men, children and adults).⁶⁸
- *Use of force and firearms:* The use of force and firearms by police is a particularly contentious issue in democratic policing and one that has led to at least a perception of abuse, in particular in relation to the use of lethal force.⁶⁹ Human rights policing requires that force be used with restraint, only when strictly necessary and proportional to lawful objectives, and that officials be trained in non-violent means of restraint and means of differentiated use of force. Firearms should be used only in extreme circumstances, when there is an imminent threat of death or serious injury of the police official or someone else (or a serious crime leading to such an immediate threat is about to be committed) and when the official has identified

him- or herself and given sufficient warning.⁷⁰ After the use of firearms, medical assistance must immediately be made available, families must be notified, a full and detailed report must be completed and investigations should be allowed where necessary.

Therefore, a democratic police service must train its staff in human rights, should instil a culture of human rights within the institution, and should hold its members accountable for not complying with human rights in their operations. In addition to the UN Pocket Book, a significant amount of work has been put into guiding the formulation of codes of conduct for police, including African and South African police agencies.⁷¹ Well managed codes of conduct, linked to clear standards of behaviour and monitoring and accountability systems that detect and correct deviation from the code, can significantly shape police practice, even in the absence of technical understanding or knowledge.

Key components of a police service that upholds and protects human rights in practice are:

- A deviation from the reliance on the defence of obedience to superior orders to justify an action, legal or illegal, and rather a reliance on knowledge and skills, provided through theoretical and practical training, both at inception and throughout the period of service, to make informed decisions in police interventions. Superiors should share responsibility for violations committed by their personnel when they know or ought to have known about a violation and did not take the necessary action to ensure accountability;⁷²
- Restraint in showing force or power, in particular with relation to investigations and crowd control. Police should especially exercise restraint in the use of force, avoid using firearms, not rely on confessions and avoid warrantless searches;⁷³

- The keeping of comprehensive written records of all policing activities involving any limitation of rights. This refers in particular to the use of force and firearms, arrest, detention and interrogations, as well as any interference in the private communication of individuals;⁷⁴
- The importance of developing soft interpersonal skills that will assist in de-escalating a situation which may lead to police interventions that would affect the rights of those interacting with the police;⁷⁵
- The principles of transparency and accountability requiring that police officials be identifiable throughout their work: in public spaces, during police interrogations and when overseeing suspects in police detention;⁷⁶
- The acceptance that policing work is stressful and requires adequate physical and mental support. Democratic police agencies support and encourage staff to use support services, especially those involved in crowd control or using firearms;⁷⁷

Therefore, two fundamental elements to ensure a human rights compliant police in practice are training and accountability. Police need to be trained in the theoretical knowledge and practical skills that enable them to perform their policing duties in line with human rights standards. Furthermore, police need to be held accountable for violating human rights.

Police as citizens

The preceding focussed almost exclusively on the impact of policing on the public and what the police must do or not do to uphold the rights of individuals and groups. It should, however, be acknowledged that police officials are also citizens and employees of the State. It should similarly be

acknowledged that police work can be extremely trying on the mental and physical health of police officials. The rights of police officials are protected by the constitution and their rights must be protected, both in their interactions with colleagues and with the public. Recognition of these facts positively shape police-public relations. One can't expect procedurally just, democratic policing where police don't believe they work for organisationally just, democratic organisations.

In many parts of the world police are actively campaigning for their rights as citizens and as employees as they sell their labour and have little control over their work processes.⁷⁸ By virtue of being citizens, Bruce and Neild note, police are entitled to the following rights and privileges that accompanies such citizenship: equity and fairness in the recruitment, promotion and remuneration processes of the police service; basic conditions of service; due processes in criminal matters against them; organisational rights and safety in the workplace.⁷⁹

Elaborating on this, Bruce and Neild note that police officials may not be discriminated against in the process of recruitment, promotion or remuneration, but concessions can be made to ensure diversity in the workplace.⁸⁰ Promotion and remuneration policies must be transparent and remuneration and benefits should be on par with other civil servants.⁸¹ Police are entitled to reasonable working hours and should be treated with respect by colleagues and superiors.⁸² They are entitled to due processes in criminal matters against them, and can exercise their right to remain silent in such instances.⁸³

Although being an essential service⁸⁴ curtails some of police officials' labour rights, they are still entitled to the basic rights to form organisations, to represent their interests and to engage in collective bargaining.⁸⁵ It is argued that the benefit of having police unions is positive as they have the capacity to confront existing (undemocratic) occupational cultures, to promote organisational accord and to forge positive reform.⁸⁶ Police, through their membership of

unions, are able to become active, participatory ‘citizens’ within police organisations and negotiate important decisions that affect them individually and collectively.⁸⁷

Law enforcement has been recognised as one of the most stressful occupations worldwide.⁸⁸ Police officers experience threatening and potentially traumatic events much more frequently than the average person.⁸⁹ Even when police are not exposed to trauma, the idea that traumatic or stressful events may occur at any moment, informs the occupational culture and shapes attitudes. It is well established that police officers are killed annually in the course of their duty, but that they are more often killed off duty and in car accidents. Bruce and Neild note that despite the fact that their careers exposes them to danger, their safety should still be safeguarded and taken into account insofar as dealing with issues such as equipment, training and operational procedures.⁹⁰

The literature suggests that an organisational structure is needed in the police profession to monitor officers’ use of maladaptive coping (e.g. excessive drinking, abuse of drugs, and high absenteeism) and the lack of adaptive coping (engaging in physical activity, communicating in a professional manner) and that allows, and strongly encourages, continued access to stress management training.⁹¹ This is due to the inherent risks associated with a career in law enforcement. The frequent exposure to occupational stress elevates the risk for adverse mental and physical health outcomes and behavioural consequence such as divorce, drug, and alcohol abuse, and in extreme instances, suicide, has demonstrated a significant positive correlation with the occupational stress police officers face.⁹²

The preceding has established that police officials have rights as citizens and employees. Further that police work is stressful and is accompanied by risks to officials’ mental and physical well-being. As employer, the state has a responsibility to provide police with fair employment practices (hiring and promotion) and fair working conditions, and make accessible support services to cope with stress.

Failure to do so will impact their effectiveness and the quality of their interactions with the public, and so the state of democratic policing.

Conclusion

The conceptual framework presented in this article is not merely intended to describe what democratic policing looks like, but rather to guide strategic planning in police organisations, including the SAPS. This relates in particular to the strategic objectives formulated in Medium Term Strategic Framework and annual performance plans with particular reference to the input variables and the outputs they need to deliver. There can be no expectation that the outputs objectivity, responsiveness and empathy will be achieved if there are not inputs articulated in annual performance plans and delivered on towards the outputs. Trust in the police will equally not improve unless the outputs are delivered on and if the public do not trust the police, the police remain with a legitimacy deficit.

It was not within the scope of this article to deal with current police performance and critique the strategic plan and the manner in which performance targets are formulated, but it has been established over a number of years that trust in SAPS have been on the decline⁹³ and from this it must be concluded that it is a consequence of failure to improve performance in respect of the other eight dimensions.

The conceptual framework also requires that when measuring police performance, it is necessary to measure what matters, and more specifically to measure what matters to the public. The number of reported crimes may attract significant media attention annually, but as a management tool, it is of limited value. What does matter to the public is whether or not the police can be trusted and trust can be measured. Measuring trust must therefore form part of the SAPS strategic plan. In short, if the strategy is not to achieve democratic policing, democratic policing will not be achieved. It must be a medium-term goal with clear and

measurable shorter term objectives covering the input variables discussed.



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